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Abstract—With the rising popularity of UAVs in the civilian
world, we are currently witnessing and paradim shift in terms
of operational safety of flying vehicles. Safe and ubiquitous
human-system interaction shall remain the core requirement
but those prescribed in general aviation are not adapted for
UAVs. Yet we believe it is possible to leverage the specific aspects
of unmanned aviation to meet acceptable safety requirements.
We start this paper with by discussing the new operational
context of civilian UAVs. We investigate the meaning of safety
in light of this new context, keeping in mind the operational
and economical constraints. Next, we explore the different
approaches to ensuring system safety from an avionics point
of view. It mostly consists in lowering failure occurrences and
managing/leveraging them. Formal verification, redundancy and
fault tolerant control are discussed and weighted against the
high cost of current methods used in commercial aviation.
Subsets of operational requirements such as geofencing or
mechanical systems for termination or impact limitation can
easily be implemented. These are presented with the goal of
limiting the collateral damages of a system failure. We then
present some experimental results regarding two of the major
problems with UAVs. With actual impacts, we demonstrate how
dangerous uncontrolled crashes can be. Furthermore, with the
large number of runaway drone experiences during civilian
operations, the risk is even higher as they can travel a long
way before crashing. We provide data on such a case where the
software controller is working, keeping the UAV in the air, but
the operator is unable to actually control the system. It should
be terminated! Finally, after having analyzed the context and
some actual solutions, based on a minimal set of requirement
and our own experience, we are proposing a simple mechanical
based safety system. It unequivocally terminates the flight in
the most efficient way. Our Active Cutting System instantly
removes parts of the propellers leaving a minimal lifting surface.
It takes advantage of what controllability may remain but with
a deterministic ending: a definite landing.
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the number of fatal accidents in the US was
down to 236 for roughly 64 million general aviation flights.
Although one should be proud of such a safety achievement,
the challenges that tomorrow will face should be addressed
in a timely and appropriate manner. Among these challenges
includes the rapid growth of the civilian UAV market, a
market that has enabled anyone who can spare a few hundred
dollars to gain full access to the general aviation airspace.
In general aviation, accidents have always had a high level
of fatalities of the people on-board (steadily around 20%
for the past 30 years [1]). Hence, the reason for rigorous
design and certifications processes. However, this level of
requirements costs a lot in terms of development time and
vehicle cost. For UAVs, the paradigm changes completely.
With unmanned vehicles, the only potential casualties be-
come the people on the ground. Since human life is at stake,
these systems now become safety critical systems that should
be certified, although the same level of certification as for
general aviation would make them impractically expensive.
Hence, new strategies should be devised in order to enable
proper safety while meeting budget and design costs.
In the current state, the lack of safety measures included
in current civilian UAVs is alarming. To begin, most civilian
UAVs are composed of “hobby-grade” components repack-
aged into a shiny fuselage. Even though some efforts have
been done to implement safety features like geofencing, the
state of the art UAV remains very far from reaching the safe-
to-crash paradigm.
This paper will focus on evaluating this paradigm change
that shifts attention from crash-free, as it is in the general
aviation, to safe-to-crash design for UAVs. Furthermore, a
thorough study of vehicle design and procedures that embrace
this new approach is included. The paper is organized by first
discussing this new paradigm of UAV safety in the light of the
present and future operational context, while defining some
high level safety requirements that fit this new paradigm.
Then, Focus is shifted towards hardware and software-based
approaches for meeting these safety requirements. Lastly, an
innovative hardware based feature is disclosed that enables
the UAV to crash safely in the event of the common “run-
away” drone situation.
I. A NEW OPERATIONAL CONTEXT
The potential applications of UAVs in the civilian com-
munity are numerous. However, safe and reliable UAVs can
only be introduced if the acquisition and operational cost is
low enough to be economically viable in today’s economy.
If performance is the only cost function, it is be easy to use
low cost consumer electronics and have very cheap products.
However, the balance between performance and safety on the
other hand can come at a steep price. For general aviation, the
cost of software validation has been observed to be as high
as half of the entire development cost. Hence, the question
becomes: How can we reach an equivalent level of safety,
but at a significantly lower cost? To answer this question
we need to understand the context in which UAVs evolve in
while mapping out the safety requirements which will enable
civilian applications.
Because no human being is on-board these systems, only
people and infrastructures on the ground are endangered
by flying UAVs. Therefore, the safety paradigm isn’t about
avoiding crashes, but about avoiding crashing into civilians
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on the ground. This high level requirement then translates
into rules concerning the vehicles and the rules concerning
the operations. This two points are fundamentally coupled,
and requirements on the vehicles cannot be decided indepen-
dently of the mission flown.
In this section one can distinguish two general scenarios:
1) UAVs operating over civilians and infrastructures, or 2)
UAVs flying in un-populated areas. In the current state of
regulations, civilian UAVs are prohibited from flying over
civilians and controlled airspace. Hence, leaving room for
softer requirements for the vehicles in terms of quality and
safety features. One could argue that it is a trust based
scenario where one must trust a human pilot to follow the
rules. Since strict training is not required to fly a UAV,
human error often becomes the main cause for UAV disasters.
Furthermore, due to the lack of presence of pilots on the
UAV, it becomes more difficult to detect and react to failures.
Therefore, it is believed that mandatory efforts should be
made to embedded decision making features into avionics in
order to ensure the enforcement of the rules at all times.
Since the safety requirements are strictly mission specific
in UAV applications, it is important to understand the op-
erational context each UAV will be subjected to in order to
design a vehicle with the appropriate safety features. Having
wings to glide to a safe area could for example be mandatory
if flying over a crowd, whereas a kill switch, instead of wings,
could be required when flying over un-populated fields to
prevent the UAV from drifting into a nearby schoolyard in
the event of a communication failure. In the end, a lot of
safety enhancing features can be incorporated intelligently
into UAV to reduce the risks and minimize the damage in
the event of a failure.
As society continues to strive forward, the level of auton-
omy in UAVs will increase proportionally. Eventually, one
can imagine reaching a state where operation becomes so
complex and fast paced that we would reach the limits of
humans capacity. Hence, a sole reliance on automated control
algorithms. In order for this scenario to reach full maturity,
a level of “automated safety” must evolve. In that futuristic
but not fairy context, human-system interfaces will play an
increasingly important role as pilots operate UAVs at higher
levels of abstractions. Eventually, the range of the scale at
which UAVs operate will be expanded, from advertising
inside a mall to long range cargo transport. Therefore, the
entire notion of airspace will require once again a revision in
order to take these different scenarios into account where the
dynamic nature of the interaction between UAVs, people and
the environment become important. In the end, it is about this
entire infrastructure that must be built around the emerging
UAV market, and making this transition to a fully automated
airspace will only be possible if safety is at the core of this
revolution.
II. SAFE-TO-CRASH UAV DESIGN: AN AVIONICS
PERSPECTIVE
A. Enforcing flight safety
As discussed in the introduction, automation can ensure
the safe operation of a UAV. In practice, this means making
sure it only flies in specific areas defined by the legislation
or by the operator. In this context, the concept of geofencing
becomes important. Similar to safety guards on interstates
that prevent a car from deviating into the in-coming traffic,
a geofence defines the operational “safe” regions of space.
Although geofencing is commonly used by defining a safe-
to-fly space using GPS coordinates, one can further define a
safe sets on the entire state space of the vehicle as well as
its flight envelope.
To address this problem, different ideas have been ex-
plored. A lot of them fall into the path-planning category.
The idea is to compute a path in a know environment
that gets the UAV to a desired position. This can be done
by solving optimization problems[23] or using randomized
algorithms[24], and if we now have the computational power
to do that in real time, it is still difficult to get formal
guaranties of safety[23]. But what happens when it is a
human controlling the system as it is the case for most
UAVs today? In that context, path planning algorithms fail
to provide an operational solution. This is where an second
kind of “obstacle avoidance” algorithm enter into play. The
idea is to operate directly inside the control loops of the
systems and enforce safety through real-time feedback. That
way, the safety is assured independently of where the input
comes from (human pilot or high level controller). Several
methods can be used to realize this approach [25] and we
are currently working on an optimization based solution to
this problem [26, 30].
B. Managing failures
Detecting and managing faults on a UAV is a task that must
be performed by the autopilot. Therefore, fault detection be-
comes an essential part of this type of safety-critical system.
For years, several methods have been proposed for detecting
possible issues in dynamic systems to anticipate the loss
of functionality. Although most of these methods are more
suitable for off-line fault detection tests [43, 31], the rapid
evolution of digital computers and micro controllers over the
past decade has enabled the implementation of online-fault-
detection algorithms either through physical redundancies or
software based algorithms [32, 33, 34].
1) Redundancies: Fault management through physical re-
dundancies allow autopilot technology the reliability nec-
essary to safely carry out sensitive flight missions by in-
corporating multiple autopilots into one device. An nth
redundant arrangement is comprised of n similar software
and hardware systems. If any one of the n systems fails,
the remaining n − 1 continue the operation. Note that an
additional “voter” mechanism is also included to oversee
these systems. Although redundant autopilots are not new
and well established within the aviation industry, military
aircraft such as the RAF’s Trident fleet used a triple re-
dundant autoland systems in the early 1960’s, and ten years
later, the Aérospatiale-BAC Concorde took advantage of 3X
technology in its flight control system, redundant autopilots
are a relatively new addition to UAVs. MicroPilot®, one of
the leading professional grade UAV autopilot manufacturers,
set the benchmark for triple redundancy UAV autopilots when
it launched the MP2128-3x at the end of 2010. Figure 1
illustrates this device. Since the autopilots do not have an
individual casing, the overall weight and real estate added
is kept to a minimum. However, the one major drawback in
this case belongs to the financial set, since each one of these
units retails for over $6,000 USD.
Fig. 1. The MP2128-3X contains three MP2128-HELI2 autopilots [45]
Fortunately, high-end “hobby-grade” flight control boards
are emerging with implemented redundancy features at sig-
nificantly lower costs. For example, the Pixhawk [46] flight
control board manufactured by 3D Robotics®, features ad-
vanced processor and sensor technology from ST Micro-
electronics® and a NuttX real-time operating system which
delivers incredible performance, flexibility, and reliability for
controlling any autonomous vehicle at a cost of $200 USD.
It uses advanced algorithms in order to perform “sanity
checks,” which compare data from different sensors and
ignore figures that seem inaccurate. It contains a dual IMU
system where an Invensense MPU 6000 supplements ST
Micro LSM303D accelerometer to provide redundancy and
improve noise immunity of the power supplies. Furthermore,
it is triple-redundant on the power supply if three power
sources are supplied and will automatically switch in the
event of failure.
2) Software Based Fault Management: As we have seen
in the previous section, professional grade autopilots are
often outside of a typical budget. Furthermore, depending
on their size, they could have a significant effect on the
performance of the vehicle and could decrease the payload
the UAV can carry. One of the benefits of online software-
based fault management is that it can be carried out at
very little added computational cost without affecting the
controlling algorithms. Software based fault detection and
management provides analytical redundancies for monitoring
the operation of the system, analyzing input-output data and
comparing the result with the nominal behavior of the system.
Some of these methods often go as far as isolating faults or
even estimating their degree of severity [32, 33, 34]. Among
various model-based fault detection methods, observer-based
methods have been studied more than the others. They
have been implemented in industry in the past for the
monitoring safety-critical systems [35, 36]. Furthermore, a
survey on those methods is included in [37]. One particularly
simple software based fault management algorithm is the
Unknown Input Observer (UIO). UIOs provide two important
functional properties related to UAV safety: detecting and
isolating faults. Arguably, the greatest benefit from this type
of software-based fault detection and isolation algorithms is
that it operates in open loop mode. Hence, it does not intrude
nor affect the vehicle’s control law since it only uses the
system’s inputs and outputs to perform its duties. Figure 2
illustrates that the system model required in model-based
fault detection and isolation is the open-loop system model
although we consider that the system is in the control loop.
This is because the input and output information required
in model-based fault detection and isolation is related to the
open-loop system. Hence, it is not necessary to consider the
controller in the design of a fault diagnosis scheme.
Fig. 2. Open loop structure of a full-order unknown input observer [33]
C. Software Reliability and Validation
The operational requirements for UAVs require the adop-
tion of advanced and intelligent control algorithms. In order
to meet safety and operational demands, significant progress
has been made towards the development of control and
health management algorithms with features like dynamic
programming, online learning and adaptation, self-tuning and
reconfiguration. However, the use of these advance control
algorithms is limited due to the fact that flight-certification
of these systems requires that they undergo thorough Verifica-
tion and Validation V&V to achieve high confidence in their
safety. Unfortunately, the certification of these algorithms has
proven to be sometimes impossible with the current state of
the art V&V practices, not to mention the immense costs
associated with such task. In the current state of V&V, certifi-
cation is highly dependent on exhaustive testing from Monte-
Carlo simulations to ensure proper functionality across the
flight envelope. However, with the increase complexity of
these algorithms, these methodologies for V&V become pro-
hibitively costly and in some cases unfeasible at achieving a
proper level of safety confidence. There are efforts underway
to improve the practical applicability of design-time V&V
approaches based on formal methods like theorem proving,
model checking, to provide mathematical proof of the safe
execution of highly complex advanced systems. The V&V
of all these algorithms and their implementation could be
similar to today’s industry standards, but the associated costs
should be measured against the overall UAV market value
for the industry to remain competitive. Minimizing the cost
of system certification via extensive process automation and
component-based system safety evaluation are definitely two
of the main challenges in this area. For example, changing a
propeller should not void the safety certificate of the UAV.
1) Credible Autocoding: Simulations and real world prac-
tical tests on system are necessary. However, we can never
test all possibilities for input signals and fault scenarios. In
addition, the software might work slightly differently from
what we expect in theory and based on original design
specifications, due to the computational errors. To detect
hidden bugs and errors we need to perform many tests. Still,
the direct link between software operation and the original
mathematical proofs is missing. This issue is more crucial
for fault detection in safety-critical systems like UAVs. In
the light of evolving software certification requirements, it
becomes important to formally specify the correctness of
these algorithms.
One way of developing reliable software for safety-critical
systems is by using formal methods, which are mathemati-
cally based languages, techniques, and tools for specifying
and verifying such systems [38]. Static software analysis
methods include “model checking”, “theorem proving” and
“abstract interpretation”, where the latter can be sometimes
interpreted as one instance of deductive software verification
[39]. Credible autocoding becomes a complement to these
methods as it focuses on software design and the ability
to insert software semantics at design and coding time as
opposed to a-posteriori semantics extraction. The semantics
included in the code look very much like those found in
deductive sequential software verification (See [39], Ch. 7).
A credible autocoding tool-chain prototype based on the-
orem proving approach had been built to automatically
generate annotated control software and then verifying them
[40, 41]. In [40, 41] the aim is to verify the stability of the
controller and closed-loop system controlled by software. For
that purpose, annotations are generated along with the control
software so that the control software can be automatically an-
alyzed by theorem proving tools. Invariant sets are chosen for
system states based on Lyapunov theory. A theorem prover
can check the validity of those invariant sets automatically
provided that it is equipped with the necessary mathematical
theories and strategies. If the sets are proved to be invariant
by such theorem prover, the software is verified. Figure 3
illustrates the credible autocoding chain.
However, it is uncertain whether these methods will ad-
dress all of the difficulties associated with achieving the
necessary confidence in the use of these algorithms in safety-
Fig. 3. Schematic of Credible Autocoding Chain [41]
critical systems. In particular, algorithms that are adaptive,
reconfigurable or non-deterministic in nature present the
greatest challenge to design-time verification approaches.
While there are also current and ongoing efforts to develop
analytical proofs and stability/convergence guarantees for
some of these algorithms, often the assurance results are
deemed relatively weak and insufficient in meeting the strin-
gent criteria for safety-critical purposes.
2) Run Time Assurance for Complex Autonomy: Since
there exists a growing realization that no single V&V ap-
proach will be sufficient to address all of the challenges
associated with providing safety guarantees for these ad-
vanced or complex systems, it is speculated among the
community that run-time monitoring or run-time verification
methods can play a complementary and enabling role [42].
The basic premise makes use of “monitors” to observe the
execution of an uncertified algorithm in question to insure
that resulting system behavior remains constrained within
acceptable bounds of stability. A schematic of the run-time
assurance methodology is illustrated through Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Run-Time Assurance Framework [42]
In a run-time assurance framework, the primary advanced
algorithm is responsible for achieving all performance objec-
tives. These algorithms can be non-deterministic, adaptive,
and enabled at all times under nominal conditions even
though it is difficult to fully certify at design time. However,
the backup system (Fail-Safe) hides in the background and
is composed of a simplified control system with emphasis on
safety rather than performance. It does not posses advanced
features that are difficult and expensive to certify. Hence,
this control law is certified at design time using state of
the art traditional methods. The RTA monitor and transition
control continually monitors the overall state of the system,
including critical parameters such as safety and operational
limits, as it compares against validated representation of
safe operating envelope. If a violation occurs, the transition
controller disables the advance system and transfers control
back to the backup system.
D. Security
One important issue with UAVs is that, not only should the
systems be safe and reliable and the operators trained and
respectful of the laws, regulations and common sense, but
should also be protected against virtual “attacks”. It should
be noted that these are also counter-measures that are being
explored by the different security authorities around the globe
as a way to control the threat that UAVs can represent.
Since they work on unlicensed bands and standard tech-
nologies it is quite easy to physically disrupt the commu-
nication channels used for controlling the drone or for its
telemetry. This can lead to some sort of simple denial of
services which will eventually cause the UAV to enter a safe
mode (Return to Home, Hover, Land, Safe Crash...). Now
someone can purposely cut the communications of a UAV.
Depending on its fail-safe program, he could therefore be
taking down the system, which would hover and eventually
land, to grab its payload, or simply steal the expensive UAV.
In our crowded “airwave” space, it would not require much
to achieve such results. The RC world mitigates the “noise”
issue with things like frequency/channel hopping or diversity,
which copes with the natural growth of the number of
objects flying at the same time and emitting simultaneously.
The notion of coexistence as it was studied between WiFi
and Bluetooth is a challenge if you extend the number of
competing and incompatible technologies and users.
Of course, the use of Return to Home mode needs a
working GPS. With the advances in cheap electronic (COTS),
GPS scrambler units (even though they are illegal in some
countries, we are not here considering people that abide the
law) or Software Defined Radio, it is feasible to make the
RTH difficult or impossible: the issue is eventually a crash or
un-managed landing. The same goes with the use of cellular
(3G/4G etc.) modems which could also be scrambled even
thought their operating frequencies are licensed.
But with the use of general RC communication technolo-
gies or more domestic wireless ones such as Bluetooth or
WiFi, or analog video, one could conduct more advances
cyber attacks such as trying to gain access to the telemetry
or the video feeds, getting data and even taking the control
of part of the remote systems.
Examples of hijacking drones have been studied and
published[21]. Even without having access to the embedded
software, remote activation and destabilization could be the
result of well thought fuzzing for example. The implemen-
tations of all the protocols used in these systems should be
tested against such attacks.
It will eventually be necessary to protect the code running
in the Ground Stations and in the UAVs. Since most of
the Ground Stations are installed on more general systems
(PCs, SmartPhones), they could be used as Trojans and leave
backdoor to access the data and controls of the drone. When
updating the firmware by downloading new ones from the
internet, the same type of attacks could be performed. In the
same principle as the one used to ensure that the controller
of the UAV behave correctly, supervision could be used
to monitor the software behavior of the controller, i.e for
example the standard succession of system calls [27].
Recently, proof of concepts of very advanced attacks such
as GPS spoofing have made the headlines [28, 29]. Using
this, a UAV path could be diverted to any other location
the attacker would want to. Regarding security and safety in
general, the last important point is to develop forensic for
the recovered drones and ground stations so that information
such as proofs of wrongdoing and identification of the
wrongdoers can be collected.
III. SAFE-TO-CRASH UAV DESIGN: A MECHANICAL
DESIGN PERSPECTIVE
Up to this point, with the exception of redundant control
boards, software-based approaches for making UAVs safer
has been the focus of this article. As the avionics become
increasingly involved, the cost of developing and maintaining
overly complex software may reach its limit and become
prohibitive. Furthermore, every effort related to V&V can
only allow us to asymptotically converge to an ideal safety
state, but the remaining tolerance has to be handled with
intelligent system design of the vehicle itself. Hence, in
some cases it may be more efficient to have simpler software
combined with efficient safety features that are implemented
at the hardware level. This approach is coherent with the
current regulation mindset that tolerates crashes as long as
they are safe for people on the ground. In what follows,
several hardware solutions will be discussed that could be
used for civilian UAVs, with special emphasis on the growing
multi-rotors scene as they seem to be the most popular
platform employed for commercial applications.
A. Reducing impact energy
As discussed earlier, the main safety requirement is about
humans. Therefore, most safety specifications are based on
potential injuries to the human body. As the head is naturally
exposed to vehicles falling from the sky, blunt head trauma is
one of the most likely injury that can have devastating short
and long term effects [14]. Therefore, reducing the projectile
impact energy, in this case the falling UAV, is the aim of this
topic. The French regulatory agency, for example, limits the
allowable impact energy to 69 Joules[12].
1) Parachutes: The most common device actually used for
UAVs is the parachute. Since its popularization during WWI,
this technology has matured and is now a relatively reliable
solution for slowing down objects. However, in order for a
parachute to have time and open, a minimum flight altitude
is required. If maximum altitudes are explicitly defined by
most regulations, it is down to the operator to fly its UAV
in order to assure the proper functioning of the device in
order to limit impact energy. This is because most regulations
prevent UAVs flights over populated area, but as we move
forward, rules similar to general aviation will have to be put
in place regarding flying over populated areas. These rules
should integrate the recovery systems capabilities of current
UAVs and maybe impose what type of technology to use.
Predefined take-off and landing site may also be part of the
solution to safely get to the minimum altitude.
Another critical component to parachute operation is its
passive nature when it comes to wind. The highest it is
deployed, the more uncertain the landing spot becomes[19].
This is true in the event of an engine jam at full throttle
on a run-away UAV. Therefore, deploying the parachute as
soon as possible may not be the best strategy. Furthermore,
even if the parachute is deployed in the proper conditions and
timing, there exists a significant number of ways in which
the canopy and/or the lines can malfunction or get stuck on a
fly-away drone whose attitude is not necessarily compatible
with parachute deployment. Note that parachutes need to be
inspected and re-folded regularly generating room for error,
especially if this task is not performed by a professional. In
the end, parachutes, if use correctly, can be efficient devices.
However, due to the low tolerance for failure, imposing
regulations on the technology itself seems necessary, as is the
usage of complementary technologies to reduce the impact
trauma on the surrounding civilians.
2) Lifting control surfaces: As we discussed previously,
a major drawbacks for parachutes is the passive, often
uncontrolled, nature of the fall. Controllable para-foils (or
ram-air) can be used in exchange, but with the same other
drawback of a parachutes. Therefore, the use of failure-
dedicated control surfaces as an integrated part of the system
becomes worthy of discussion. Such a device could allow a
failed system to navigate away from a crowd and is likely to
reduce the impact energy. A thorough investigation revealed
that similar concepts have been developed in recent years[20].
Furthermore, it was noted that the real-state impact and
weight associated could be kept at minimum on a classical
multi-rotor.
In complement to control surfaces, a lifting component
could be added to better slow down the fall. A similar
concept made the dynamic stability of the Virgin Galactic
SpaceShipTwo system possible. To conclude, the need for
hybrid vehicles that combine wings and stationary flight
capabilities is already present, and it is simply a matter of
time before purely vertical flight UAVs such as the classical
multi-rotors become a thing of the past.
3) Controlled disintegration: Parachutes and lifting sur-
faces mainly aim at lowering impact velocity, but it has
been discussed that another way to minimize impact energy
would be to reduce the UAVs mass through a controlled
disintegration. Strategically destroying the vehicle is defi-
nitely not appropriate for general aviation where the safety
of the people on board is the priority, but with UAVs it
becomes a interesting and viable option. This option has been
discussed in the distant but not antithetical context of asteroid
deflection [5] where transforming a big mass into a cloud of
smaller debris allows for a better dissipation of energy into
the atmosphere.
If the explosion is quite dramatic for asteroid deflection
(nuclear explosion!), it can be applied in a much more
controlled and safe way for UAV. Polymer-bonded explosives
PBX for example, exhibit good strength and machining
capabilities[7, 6]. This material could therefore be used for
making specific parts of the vehicle to provide controlled
destruction capabilities of the UAV. Sequential destruction
strategies could then be though of to intelligently reduce
the vehicle into smaller pieces, possibly through a chain
reaction as is done in building demolition[8] or rocket stage
separation[9]. Despite they intimidating nature, pyrotechnics
are now a well mastered technology that the general public
is subjected to on a daily basis[11] and could very well play
a major role in the UAVs of tomorrow.
B. Reducing impact force
Restricted kinematic energy at impact is necessary to
minimize the risk of blunt trauma, but one must realize that
it is definitely not enough to ensure the physical integrity of
people on the ground. It doesn’t take much energy to create
irreversible trauma in the case of impact of the human skull
against a hard surface. As we can see in [4], it doesn’t take
much either to perforate human flesh with a small UAV parts.
The overall geometry of the vehicle is therefore fundamental
in preventing fractures and penetrating trauma. Ducted fans
and smooth structures (i.e. without protruding parts or with
shells) could for example greatly reduce the likelihood of
such injuries. Note that a real full scale UAV collision with
a human dummy will be performed at Georgia Tech this
summer to study the technical and legal repercussions of such
an incident. Following this idea, we will discuss 3 solutions
to reduce impact stress of crashing UAVs.
1) Airbags for UAVs: The automotive industry introduced
airbags in the mid-1970s which has had a very positive
impact on the reduction of accident casualties[15]. It is
very efficient to absorb energy during a shock and reduce
the impact force. Unsurprisingly, this technology is used to
soften UAV landing when done via a parachute like for
the Elbit Systems - Skylark II. Research has been done
for this specific use of airbags[3] and companies are even
developing dedicated products for UAV applications[2]. It
is interesting to note that at the moment, airbags are only
used to prevent damage to the vehicle, but could be a key
player in protecting civilians as well. If asking everybody
to wear a personal airbag seems a bit out of proportion,
even though it is not completely unimaginable[10], requiring
that all UAVs carry an airbag system activated in case of
emergency would make sense. Used in conjunction with
energy reducing features, airbags may prove very efficient
at minimizing human injuries, especially because of their
very fast speed of deployment[16]. Note that the deployment
trigger can obviously not be the impact itself like in cars,
and that a preventive strategy is needed. Because of the
deployment speed of such systems, the minimum altitude
requirement is not as constrained as with the parachute.
2) Engine neutralization: As seen earlier in [4], propellers
present with their sharp profile and fast rotating speed are
an important danger for humans, even when the vehicle is
not moving. To address this specific threat, several passive
solutions can be implemented like ducted fans or protection
shells [17]. Furthermore, active solution can also imple-
mented in the same vain as controlled disintegration, were
propellers could be jettisoned in case of emergency. This
is particularly relevant in case of motor controller lockup.
Through proper design, the jettisoned propellers could use
their own shape to slow down their descent like maple keys
falling from the trees. This way, the rotational energy of
the propellers is reduced (because not attached to the rotor
anymore) and they become much less harmful to people
on the ground. One obvious problem with this approach
is the fact that now you have a UAV free falling out of
control. Also, motor brakes could be implemented on the
same model as for [18] but specifically designed for electric
motors. Again, such technology is relatively straight-forward
and could potentially prevent severe injuries in the future
(ocular trauma for example). Finally, intelligently cutting the
propellers could be a great solution to maintain control of
the vehicle while assuring it doesn’t have power to continue
flying, hence get back to the ground in a controller descent...
as we will see in subsection IV-C
3) Energy absorbing structures: Borrowing concepts from
the automotive industry, energy absorbing structures is a key
technology for minimizing trauma in case of collision. This
is achieved through proper geometrical design and material
choice, usually utilizing the various FEA analysis tools
currently available. These tools allow engineers to precisely
control the way structures will fail without relying on costly
destructive testing, and for example chose the failure points to
maximize plastic deformation and energy absorption during
crash. Thanks to the recent rise of additive manufacturing
technologies, intricate polymer or metallic structures can now
be build with a single mouse click. Resistant and highly
optimized structural elements can therefore be incorporated
into UAVs like porous or composite parts (ref needed), that
way providing good strength and energy absorption at the
same time. Because these features are fundamentally passive
and an integrant part of the vehicles structures, no complex
electronic mechanism is required hence making them very
reliable and relatively inexpensive compare to additional
device like airbags of parachutes.
IV. CASE STUDY
A. Impact
As UAVs get more and more capable, their weights and
sizes increase proportionally. The duality of these two factors
not only represents the likelihood of a drone impacting with
a human is increasing[13], but also the damage associated
with such collision also increases. In the state of current
regulations, UAV’s weights can legally range between 0.5 and
55 lbs. Any object within this mass range falling at proper
velocity can cause serious injury to a human. Furthermore,
as the head is naturally exposed to vehicles falling from the
sky, blunt head trauma is one of the most likely types of
injuries. According to Knight [44], a human skull can be
fractured with forces as little as 73 Newtons, and with very
high probabilities at forces exceeding 510 Newtons.
In the evaluation of crash data from one of Georgia
Tech’s fast descent-recovery experiments, it was observed
that crashes of a midsize recreational quad-copter with a mass
of 2.5 kg (5.5 lbs) can involve accelerations exceeding 10
g’s, implying an impact force around 250 Newtons. Figure 5
illustrates the accelerometer data of an event in which a
vehicle was not able to recover from a fast descent, ultimately
crashing into the ground below.
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Fig. 5. Filtered IMU data from the Pixhawk control board
It is noted that this is enough force to cause fractures to the
skull approximately 50% of the time. Components such as
plastic, fiberglass spars, and landing gear pieces were shown
to contain enough energy to cause penetrating wounds when
broken and can further increase that chances of a fatal impact.
Hence, it was concluded that an impact of this type can cause
a variety of life threatening injuries to the human body. A
concussion can be caused by accelerations of the head at
8.5 m/s2. Evaluations of crash data show accelerations of
upwards of 100 m/s2 are very possible and a concussion from
a drone strike like this is almost certain. Figure 6 illustrates
the crash scene corresponding to the data shown in Figure 5.
A video of this even can be found by clicking here.
Fig. 6. Forensics of a UAV crash
The ability for UAVs to cause harm is not an argument
against UAVs, but rather a reason and a framework for look-
ing critically at UAV safety. By understanding the potential
and magnitude for bodily harm UAVs can cause, the industry
can work to reduce the likelihood of causing injury.
B. Runaway
As the UAV industry continues its rapid growth, it strug-
gles to overcome a major problem known among the en-
thusiastic community as “fly-away.” Fly-aways is a term
used to describe a UAV that has gone wild and flown off
from its user. They are one of several safety risks that the
drone industry and aviation officials are aiming to solve. This
problem has been around for many years now, dating back
to a military-drone operation in 2010 who struggled with a
3K lb. unmanned helicopter as it glided autonomously for
30 minutes after a software glitch severed its connection
to its U.S. Navy pilots. Furthermore, in October of 2015,
U.S. Army pilots lost control of a hand-held drone over
Columbus, Ga., telling air-traffic controllers the device was
headed southwest and would run out of fuel in 40 minutes.
Technology has made UAVs cheaper and easier to fly,
giving anyone who can spare a few hundred dollars access
to small aircraft that can climb thousands of feet. UAV’s
can zoom off or drift away with the wind for a variety of
reasons, including software glitches, bad GPS or compass
data, connection errors between receivers and transmitters,
or simple human error. Human error can occur due to either
pilot inexperience or failure to properly calibrate the compass
or configure its fail-safe functions.
Many incidents end with the devices barreling into homes,
buildings, trees, bodies of water, and in some cases civilians
[16]. Although there are not statistics on the number of fly-
aways yet, examples abound and can be found all over private
YouTube channels.
According to an article by the Wall Street Journal, a poll of
774 people who owned a popular 2.8 lb. UAV revealed that
nearly a third of the users had experienced a flyaway at some
point. Furthermore, 122 of these users never saw their devices
again. An extensive search among online threads reveled that
the most common cause for fly-away drones is the “return to
home” setting, a feature that returns the device to its takeoff
spot in case of a lost connection or a low battery. However,
impatient users who fly their drones before the devices have
saved the “home” location often find their drones heading to
a previous takeoff spot, which could be several states away.
Thanks to the generosity of the Afman Aeromechanic’s
Laboratory at Georgia Tech, Figure 7 illustrates the control
inputs from one of their own run-away drones, which oc-
curred on one occasion upon landing a UAV after it signaled
for battery. Strangely, the quad-rotor received an external
throttle input without command from the pilot. This caused
the vehicle to rapidly accelerate upwards, uncontrolled and
unresponsive to pilot input. It can be seen that constant
throttle inputs were recorded by the Pixhawk flight controller,
despite the fact that no throttle inputs were made by the pilot.
The UAV drifted approximately 100 yards up and away from
the operator before the battery dropped below operational
levels, causing it to plummet uncontrolled to the ground in
a non populated field.
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Fig. 7. Control Inputs from a Run-Away Drone
Ultimately, preventing fly-away drones either requires a
fix in the core technology, or the introduction of innovative
concepts. GPS and on-board compasses, used to help orient
and stabilize the devices, can set drones adrift if tall build-
ings, cellphone towers or even solar flares interfere with their
accuracy. Furthermore, electromagnetic interference, which
many electrical systems emit, can also potentially disrupt
the compass and the link between a drone and its controller.
Therefore, a solution devised by this team of researchers will
now be discussed in the following chapter.
C. The Optimal Active Breaking Braking System: an inno-
vative safety solution for UAVs
After having written in former paragraphs how we believe
safety in the UAV should be considered and handled, we’ve
tried ourselves to apply the minimum set that we deem
necessary. This led to the following requirements for a simple
yet efficient solution to a safe termination of a flight, applied
here to a multi-rotor:
1) It should react quickly
2) This solution shouldn’t allow for an on flight or quick
recovery: when it’s been activated, we can’t come back
to a normal operation with a flip of a switch
3) The system should give a chance to control the speed
and the path of the descent, in order to limit the kinetic
energy on impact, possibly keep it in a given attitude
(no high speed spinning, flipping) and ideally to steer
it away from people, animals or important objects
Fig. 8. Propeller breaking tool, before and after actuation
We came up with the Optimal Active Breaking Braking
System. It is being prototyped and tested at the time of this
writing, but a proof of concept has been developed. Each
arm of a quadcopter is equipped with a servomotor that (very
quickly) pushes a blade in the paths of the rotating propellers.
Fig. 9. The OABBS system
Its purpose is, when activated, to cleanly cut them to
an optimized length that lowers the lift to a controlled
descending speed, even at full throttle. This leaves enough
propeller surface to still be able to guide the UAV in its
landing, thus allowing to avoid people or structures on the
ground if enough control is left of the system. Finally, the
operator can’t just go back to work with this UAV, he has
to change at least the propellers. A video of this system in
action is provided by clicking here.
Fig. 10. Clean cuts on different types of blade
This could also work in cooperation with a smart
parachute[22]: what’s left of maneuverability can ensure it’s
deployed with an optimal attitude.
CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the safety paradigm differences sep-
arating commercial UAVs and General Aviation, placing
strict emphasis in the fact that a UAV should be crash-safe
by design. Suggestions on how to manage safety demands
associated with regulatory agencies such as software Val-
idation and Verification as well as security related issues
are addressed from an avionics and mechanical design per-
spective. This perspective includes suggestions on how to
make commercial UAVs a reality while maintaining software
validation and verification costs in mind, which have the
potential to cripple the entire UAV revolution. Furthermore,
a mechanical design perspective explores several solutions
on how one can reduce the danger associated with failed
devices from a design perspective, with special emphasis
on reducing impact energy. Lastly, a case study, using real
crash data from the Afman Aeromechanics Laboratory at
Georgia Tech, evaluates the energy of an impact and suggests
a novel mechanical solution that is introduced in this paper
for the first time. This novel device aims at tackling the
single biggest issue encountered by UAV pilots to date, safely
landing a run away UAV.
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